



Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Kilby, Karen (2014) 'Christian theology, anti-liberalism, and modern Jewish thought.', in Judaism in
contemporary thought : traces and inﬂuence. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 155-164. Routledge Jewish
studies series.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.routledge.com/9780415739221
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Judaism in Contemporary Thought:
Traces and Inﬂuence on 07/04/2014, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9780415739221
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Christian Theology, Anti-Liberalism and Modern Jewish Thought 
 
 In this paper I will explore not so much the impact or trace of modern Jewish thought 
on Christian theology, as its absence, its absence in particular at a juncture where one might 
have expected to find it. I want to probe, that is to say, a point at which the influence of 
modern Jewish thought is strikingly missing from contemporary Christian theological debates, 
and consider what might be the value to Christian theology of a greater engagement at this 
point. 
There are, of course, traces of Judaism, and of modern Jewish thought specifically, to 
be found in contemporary Christian theology. Buber, or at least a few themes from Buber, are 
widely quoted. One can find Christian theologians grappling with Levinas in various ways. 
Hannah Arendt appears from time to time, Hans Jonas is beginning to become a presence, and 








 century Christian theology, a serious 
wrestling with the question of Christianity’s relation to Judaism. Christianity’s traditional 
supersessionism, its traditional displacement theology, has been formally repudiated by a 
number of churches, and the question of how this repudiation requires a reshaping of the 
whole pattern of Christian narrative and doctrine continues to be a matter for reflection. 
Kendall Soulen’s The God of Israel and Christian theology2 offers an impressive example of 
this sort of work, and a forthcoming volume by Peter Ochs, Another Reformation:Postliberal 
Christianity and the Jews
3
, undertakes an important analysis, from a Jewish perspective, of a 
whole series of so-called postliberal Christian theologies with respect to their position on 
supersessionism. 
 This belated self-correction of Christian theology is very important, but engagement 
with Jewish thought—certainly with recent Jewish thought-- is not, as far as I can see, a 
particularly central or necessary part of it. What is primarily at issue, if one wants to get away 
from supersessionism, is how Christian theology arranges its own elements: how it sees one 
part of its Scriptures in relation to another; how it understands one theological concept—that 
of ‘Church’—in relation to another—‘Israel’; and so on. What is at stake, to put it slightly 
differently, is a reform of how Christians think about Jews—and a number other things in 
light of this—but not necessarily a particular focus on how Jews think of Christianity.4  
 The focus of this paper, then, will be on one recurring theme in modern Jewish 
thought, and particularly in modern Jewish thinking about Christianity, which has to my 
knowledge made no impact whatsoever on Christian theology, and my proposal will be that 




                                           
1
 The frequency with which appeal to Buber is made by Christian thinkers, and the paucity of reference of a 
figure like Rosenzweig, might suggest that the ‘canon’ of modern Jewish thinkers as perceived by Christian 
theologians has its own distinctive shape.  
2
 R. Kendall Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Augusburg Fortress, 1996). 
3
 Peter Ochs, Another Reformation: Postliberal Christianity and the Jews (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 
2011) 
4
 It is important not to exaggerate the distinction I am drawing here. Soulen, for example, is insistent that ‘the 
path beyond supersessionism must go by way of renewed encounter with the theological claims of Jewish 
existence’ (The God of Israel, p.5) and himself draws upon the work of Michael Wyschogrod.  
The theme in question revolves around the notion of paganism. A number of Jewish 
thinkers over the last few centuries have envisaged some form of fundamental contrast 
between Judaism and paganism, and many present Christianity either as poised between the 
two poles, or as aligned with one—with Judaism --but nevertheless subject to a distinct 
leaning, a distinct temptation, towards the other—as constantly in danger of sliding towards 
paganism.  
This is a pattern that seems to emerge in the Jewish Enlightenment, with a thinker like 
Solomon Formstecher, for instance, contrasting the religion of nature with the religion of 
spirit, where the religion of nature is termed paganism and the purest example of the religion 
of spirit is Judaism.
5
 In the one God is identified with nature, in the other God is recognized 
as transcending nature. Christianity and Islam are fundamentally classified, along with 
Judaism, on the side of a religion of spirit, but Christianity in fact contains a mixture of the 
false paganism with the ‘true transcendence of Judaism’ and Christianity’s history is 
construed as the history of a struggle between these elements. Or again, Samuel Hirsch 
presents religion in terms of paganism, Judaism, and Christianity, with paganism being 
valueless, Judaism representing the true religion which recognizes ethical freedom and the 
transcendence of God, and Christianity lying somewhere in the middle, having corrupted its 
Jewish inheritance with notions of original sin and salvation by Christ. 
In the thought of a figure like Franz Rosenzweig, things become more complex, but 
something of the same pattern seems to emerge. Paganism is no longer characterized 
completely negatively, nor is the term used quite so broadly as a catch-all for everything 
contrasted to Judaism. Paganism seems to be paradigmatically the position of the ancient 
Greeks, and in Rosenzweig’s thought it stands in contrast to, and in position of superiority to, 
religions of the East such as Buddhism—and also indeed to Islam. So Rosenzweig’s 
presentation of paganism is at least partly symphathetic—it seems to represent something like 
the best we can do, the highest expression of human longing, prior to revelation. Rosenzweig 
also, in a certain sense, has a very positive view of Christianity—it is not understood, in its 
difference from Judaism, purely in terms of corruption, lack, deviation, but as having, 
alongside Judaism, a crucial providential role. 
So the story is considerably more complex in Rosenzweig, but for all that something 
of the pattern of the thinkers of the Haskalah is still to be found: Rosenzweig presents 
Christians as always threatened by a reversion into paganism. Thus, while Jews are born 
Jewish, Christians always have to become Christian—they all begin as pagans, they are 
constantly needing to resist their paganism.
6
 Rosenzweig writes that there is a ‘piece of 
paganism in every Christian’, and it shows itself in the centrality of the incarnation, in the fact 
that the Christian can only trust that God wants to condescend to him if God can appear as 
man, in the fact that for the Christian God’s vitality only becomes real if it appears in the flesh 
of a particular man.
7
  Or again, Rosenzweig suggests that because Christianity has to be on a 
mission to incorporate the pagan peoples within it, it is constantly in danger of absorbing the 
                                           
5
 The account of figures from the Jewish Enlightenment in this paragraph draws from Norbert M. Samuelson’s 
An Introduction to Modern Jewish Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).  
6
 ‘This is indeed the profoundest difference between the Jewish and the Christian man, that the Christian man, 
innately, or at least on account of birth—is a pagan, but the Jew is a Jew. So the way of the Christan must be a 
way of self-renunciation, he must always go away from himself, give himself up in order to become Christian’ 
Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, tr. Barbara E. Galli, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2005), p 430. 
7
 Ibid, p.371. It is worth mentioning that the discussion here concludes on a rather positive note: ‘precisely that 
“paganism” of the Christian qualifies him for the conversion of the pagans.’ 
paganism itself. Christianity hovers, then, necessarily but also dangerously, problematically, 
between Judaism and paganism. 
 To bring things up to our own time we might point to a figure like my colleague Agata 
Bielik-Robson. Bielik-Robson is engaged in an ambitious project of intellectual reorientation, 
seeking to persuade us to redraw our fundamental philosophical and cultural maps so that 
Jewish thought can be seen not as a marginal and peculiar phenomenon, a ‘Yiddish twist’ on 
the fringes of mainstream cultural developments
8
, but rather as both a powerful shaping force 
on modernity and the bearer of one of the fundamental options which now lies open to us. Her 
argument  is woven in part out of an exploration of and conversation with a wide range of 
figures, and quite frequently we meet, once again, in her thought and in her treatment of 
others, ‘pagan’ as a category which stands in some kind of  fundamental opposition to the 
Jewish.
9
 And though the role or significance of Christianity does not (thus far, in any case) 
hold as prominent a place in her thought as it does in that of Rosenzweig, there are clear 






Now, if one accepts that there is such a strand in modern Jewish thought, one might 
suppose that there is in fact good reason why Christian theologians have not thus far attended 
to it. One might suppose that Christian theology, if it is going to remain in any sense 
Christian, must simply reject or dismiss this accusation of paganism; that what is at stake here 
is an irreducible difference between Christianity and Judaism, so that a theologian could not 
ask whether there might not be something worth worrying listening to here, and in particular 
something worth worrying about, without thereby in fact ceasing to be a specifically 
Christian theologian. 
 Certainly some of the aspects of Christianity which have been associated by Jewish 
thinkers with paganism, such as the incarnation  or the link between Christ and salvation are 
non-negotiable for most main-stream Christians. But the recurring concern about a kind of 
pagan temptation of Christianity seems to go beyond this, at least in some of its articulations: 
it is not just that Christianity is presented as being pagan, or partly pagan, but that it is 
depicted  as tempted in this direction, as exposed to particular dangers of drifting off in this 
direction. And given that Christianity does also understand itself as holding onto an 
affirmation of God’s transcendence, God’s otherness from nature, from creation, then it ought 
to have its own reasons for taking seriously any suggestions that it is in fact in danger of 
sliding into paganism. 
                                           
8
 Bielik-Robson regrets the tendency of most histories of Jewish thought to present a ‘Jewish irredeemable 
particularity which always adds something exotically “Yiddish” to the clear and universal idiom of Western 
philosophy’ (‘Is there such a thing as Jewish Philosophy’, University of Nottingham Inaugural lecture).  
9
 C.f. for instance the presentation of certain understandings of the sublime as pagan in “Troubles with Divine 
Aesthetics: A. J. Heschel’s Tarrying with the Sublime,” in Abraham Joshua Heschel. Philosophy, Theology and 
Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Adam Lipszyc and Stanisław Krajewski, Harrasowitz Verlag: Wiesbaden 2009, pp. 
67-86, or the way the category is introduced through a discussion of Rosenzweig in “Nihilism through the 
Looking Glass: Nietzsche, Rosenzweig, and Scholem on the Condition of Modern Disenchantment,” in Revero. 
Revista  de Estudas da Religiao, San Paulo, Spring 2008. 
 
10
 One can see this, for example, in ‘Nihilism Through the Looking Glass,’ and its examination of what is 
involved in certain understandings of the resurrection and in  certain Christian theologies of participation and the 
beatific vision. 
The issue is of course a large one, but one dimension of the Judaism/paganism pattern 
of thought that I will focus on here is the link that some Jewish thinkers suggest between 
paganism and modern disenchantment, or rather, the link between the repudiation of 
paganism and the disenchantment of modernity. If paganism has something to do with the 
sacralization of nature, sheer awe at the greatness of being, if it has something to do with 
finding and worshipping something divine in the world, then the modern process of 
disenchantment, of stripping the world of its sacredness, of its mythic qualities, of its meaning 
even, should be understood not so much nostalgically as a loss of a necessary religious 
sensibility, as a development which makes it harder for the modern person to turn to God, but 
in a fundamentally more positive light. Modern disenchantment is something Jewish thought 
can be seen both to move towards and to affirm. If a mythicising paganism is no longer an 
option, then faced with a meaningless world stripped bare, the possibility of acknowledging 





Christian theology, I have already suggested, gives no attention to the strand of 
thought I have been discussing. A reader of Christian theology will not meet ‘paganism’ as a 
category of critique or concern  in contemporary Christian thought, much less any reflection 
on whether Christianity itself may be peculiarly threatened by a temptation towards it. One 
could perhaps point to the category of ‘idolatry’ as the closest approximation-- idolatry as 
temptation and danger can appear as a concern in Christian theology, though not necessarily 
at the moment a particular dominant one—but the term functions considerably more narrowly 
than the notion of  ‘paganism’ and the richly texture discussion which surrounds it in  seems 
to in modern Jewish thought.
12
 
It would be difficult to give a unified positive account of the state of contemporary 
Christian theology, but one thing common to many of the strongest voices, certainly in recent 
British and American theology— voices ranging from Hauerwasians to the followers of the 
so-called Yale school to the adherents of Radical Orthodoxy to the Barthians—is a negative 
point: they are united in rejecting theological liberalism, not only the 19
th
 century liberalism 
running from Schleiermacher through Ritschl, but anything which much more broadly could 
be said to smack of liberalism. The danger is understood to be one of accommodation, loss of 
nerve, loss of theological substance, loss of Christian distinctiveness.  A liberal is seen as one 
who is so concerned to adopt to the times, or to make sense to the mentality of our age, or to 
speak to the modern person, or to justify the rationality or the meaningfulness of Christianity, 
so concerned to do all these things that they in fact distort the gospel, evacuate theology of its 
proper content. What is valued across at least a number of these otherwise differing groups, I 
think, is the capacity to articulate Christian distinctiveness, and often to retrieve pre-modern 
modes of thought, ways of doing theology, ways of reading scripture. 
This is not intended to paint a picture of contemporary Christian theology as 
fundamentalist. Many in fact argue that fundamentalism is just the other side of the same coin 
                                           
11
 In ‘Nihilism through the Looking Glass’ Bielik-Robson highlights (in the context of a larger and more 
complex argument, which has a confrontation between ‘the Nietzscheans’ and ‘the Hebrews’ at its core) an 
affirmation of Entzauberung, the embracing of a modern secularizing disenchantment as a necessary religious 
moment, as a feature of the thought of a number of modern Jewish thinkers. So, for instance, she writes ‘for 
Rosenzweig (and for the whole Judaic tradition, for which Rosenzweig serves here as a spokesman and pars pro 
toto), religion… is a mature, courageous stance towards reality, actively forcing its demythologization and 
disenchantment.’  
12
 One is more likely in contemporary Christian theology to find idolatry employed as a term of critique ad 
extra—the idolatry of capitalism or of the celebrity culture, for instance—than as tool for self-examination. 
as liberalism, equally enthralled to a modern mindset and equally mistaken. Nor ought this 
description of a dominant anti-liberalism suggest that current Christian theologians are simply 
conservative, or simply wanting to retreat into the middle ages. They may value a rediscovery 
of certain pre-modern ways of thinking, but it is a matter of rediscovery, of creative retrieval, 
and not simply of blind repetition. Modern and liberal values are as a matter of fact present, in 
my judgment, in the way contemporary theologians proceed., but their focus, and the focus of 
current Christian theological rhetoric, tends not to be on any of this, but on the need to 
preserve distinctiveness and on the dangers of liberal accommodation. 
In the dominant voices of contemporary Christian theology, then--the theology of the 
past fifteen or twenty years at least—‘modernity’ appears principally in negative guise, as 
danger, as that which we must avoid judging ourselves by and moulding ourselves to. It 
appears as that which is alien, as that which distorts.  There have certainly been theologians in 
the last half century who have taken a far more positive approach, who have found in 
modernity something positive for Christian faith, something that represents an advance, a 
clarification, an opportunity—but such thinkers all now have the ring of liberals, and as a 
result they are little published, little read, little taught, little written on-- they do not get much 
attention, except occasionally as foil. 
 
IV 
If the rejection of paganism, as I suggested above, has been linked to one of the central 
features of modernity—disenchantment—does it follow that  nervousness of modernity might 
in fact carry with it particular dangers of paganism? The link, stated thus abstractly, sounds 
perhaps a little far-fetched, but experience may bear it out. I want to consider at this point a 
kind of case study: two Roman Catholic theologians, Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, one German and one German-speaking Swiss, near contemporaries who were at 
their intellectual peak in the 1950s, 60s and 70s.  
Rahner and Balthasar are not infrequently treated as signalling two very different 
roads down which Roman Catholic theology could go. Some, particularly Rahnerians, have 
wanted to be more irenic, to avoid polarisation, to see Rahner and Balthasar as 
complementary rather than contrasting figures, but after quite a long period of reflection I am 
inclined to think it is probably right that they really do represent distinctly contrasting 
possibilities. In any case, in the 1960s and early 1970s, Rahner’s star was in the ascendant, 
Balthasar a rather doubtful and shadowy figure, but since then Balthasar’s standing in the 
Church and among theologians has been steadily ascending, while Rahner is very much less 
in fashion. And this is true outside of Roman Catholicism as much or more than it is true 
within it—Balthasar is the conversational partner of choice for a whole range of Protestant 
and Anglican thinkers who wish to engage with a Catholic, whereas Rahner is routinely 
dismissed. 
One point on which Rahner and Balthasar quite sharply diverge is precisely in their 
relation to modernity. Rahner tends to stress that we all are inescapably modern, that 
Christian faith must be formulated in an idiom that the modern person can understand and 
integrate with their thinking more broadly, and indeed that there are aspects of modernity 
which contribute to something like a purification of Christian faith. Balthasar’s rhetoric 
towards modernity is, on the other hand-- at least after a certain point in his development-- 
almost entirely negative. Modernity is cast generally in terms of loss, of lack, of deficiency, of 
blindness: it is something whose self-satisfaction and smugness needs to be pierced.
13
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 For a more extended discussion of the relationship between the two, and their differing attitudes to modernity, 
c.f. my "Balthasar and Karl Rahner" in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, eds. Edward T. 
Oakes , S. J. and David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
The positive, or partly positive, tone that Rahner takes towards modernity is a 
significant part of what has led to his marginalization in more recent theology. His thought is 
routinely presented as controlled, shaped, distorted, by an option for modern philosophical 
thought in general, or the Kantian transcendental turn more specifically. And conversely the 
fact that Balthasar is seen as standing apart from modernity, as presenting a genuinely 
different possibility for theology, seems to be a significant dimension of his appeal. 
But the reason for attending to Rahner and Balthasar in this context is not just to see 
that Christian theologians take different stances towards modernity, and at the moment the 
anti-modern tone is winning more votes. What is particularly interesting is that Balthasar’s 
anti-modern rhetoric does indeed seem to go hand in hand with what one might call a slide 
towards paganism. 
I have avoided offering any very precise conception of paganism—the various figures 
whom I mentioned do not necessarily present it in exactly the same way—but I think it is safe 
to say that on almost any conception of what paganism might be, Balthasar can be seen as 
moving Christian theology in that direction. There are a number of ways one might make this 
point—one could talk about the significance of his developing a notion of a so-called 
‘theological aesthetics’, or even perhaps of the implications of his dramatic approach to 
theology. One could perhaps examine the consequences of the unusual role in his theology 
given to Adrienne von Speyer and her mystical experiences. But what I will focus on here is 
what one might call his ‘re-mythologizing’ of Christianity. 
This process of re-mythologizing goes on in a quite wide-spread way across 
Balthasar’s oeuvre. It is possible to understand his much-discussed theology of Holy 
Saturday, with its vivid and untraditional presentation of Christ’s sinking passively into hell, 
as one dead among the dead, and enduring the full horror of abandonment and rejection by 
God, as a kind of innovative mythologization of the atonement. One can look more generally 
at his treatment of the eternal relations between the persons of the Trinity, which he can 
somehow describe in considerable detail—a kind of detail that I have met nowhere else in the 
Christian tradition-- complete with references of the divine persons’ gratitude, amazement,  
prayer towards one another, their consideration for one another, even their decision-making 
procedures (he seems able to know, for instance, that the Father has the general intention of 
saving the world, but leaves it to the Son to decide exactly how to go about it).
14
 
Alternatively, one can look at his presentation of the  characters who surround Jesus in 
the Gospels—Mary, Peter, John, Paul—not as historical individuals, but as the fundamental 
constellation of the Church, as quasi-eternal types, so that Peter, for instance, represents not 
just himself, a particular individual, nor even, as you might expect for a Roman Catholic, the 
first in the line of popes, but actually the institutional element in the church as such,  popes, 
bishops and clergy, hierarchy, the need for order and rules, for office in the church; and again 
John represents not just an individual, but love, the saints, the charismatic element, sanctity in 
the church. And so when Peter and John go to the empty tomb, and John arrives first but 
stands aside for Peter, this is an expression of the relation of the church as holiness to the 
church as institution. One might argue that it mythicising reading of Mary is well-established 
in the Catholic tradition, but here Balthasar is not simply taking up familiar patterns, but 
freely inventing new ones. 
What is in my judgment the most significant and disturbing element of 
remythologization Balthasar introduces appears in what is sometimes rather euphemistically 
described as his ‘nuptial theology’. Gender difference—the difference between the man, 
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 For a fuller discussion of Balthasar’s Trinitarian theology and its extraordinarily well-informed quality, c.f. 
my ‘Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Trinity’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, ed. Peter C. Phan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
construed as active and taking initiative, and the woman, construed as receptive—plays a key 
role in Balthasar’s thought, as does also the pattern of sexual reproduction. One meets 
gendered conceptions of activity and receptivity, and indeed images of seeds and wombs, at 
almost every level in Balthasar’s writings. He makes much of the scriptural image of the 
Church as the bride of Christ, and he also wants to retrieve the traditional deduction from this 
that Mary should be viewed as the bride of Christ. But he also, going beyond anything that 
one can find in the tradition,so far as I am aware, views the relation of the institutional church 
to the laity is as a male/female relation—in fact as a relation to be spoken of in terms of 
insemination and of ‘bearing fruit’—and he conceives of relationships within the Trinity in 
gendered manner: the Son is feminine with respect to a masculine Father, since the Father as 
begetter is the initiator, and the Son receives everything from the Father. But above all, and 
running through nearly all his thought, is the notion that the God-world relation must be 
conceived in male-female terms, because God is the initiator, the active party, and the world 
is receptive, but able to bear fruit. The systematic way this kind of thinking permeates his 
work suggests that for Balthasar this is not one metaphor among other possible metaphors for 
speaking about something which eludes us, but that this really is the nature of God’s relation 
to the world, or to put it another way, this really is the deepest meaning of the man-woman 
relationship and of sex itself. So for instance Balthasar argues that priests cannot be women, 
because they must represent Christ in relation to the church, and Christ was not just 




Unsurprisingly, there has been a certain amount of criticism of Balthasar’s conception 
of ‘man’ and ‘woman’, and a certain hesitation, at least, as regards his introduction of gender 
into the Trinity. But in general what I have been describing as remythologizing passes more 
or less uncriticised in most of the literature surrounding Balthasar. Commentators note 
perhaps that his thought is at times ‘idiosyncratic’ and surprising, but generally they associate 
this with the originality and energy of his work, and the enviable freedom Balthasar has 
achieved from the constraints that modern theology usually allows itself to be put under: he is 
not engaged in a dessicated, spiritually dry academic style of theology; he is not frightened or 
controlled by the demands of historical-critical scholarship; he is not buying into a narrow, 
impoverished vision of rationality of the Enlightenment. 
 
V 
Balthasar, then, might be taken to exemplify the dangers of a slide towards paganism 
within Christian theology, and in particular of a slide towards paganism which may be 
correlated with a theology which sets its face too simply against modernity. But more than I 
am interested in Balthasar here, I am interested in the  reception of Balthasar by other 
Christian theologians, Catholic and non-Catholic. In fact I know a number of theologians who 
have little time for Balthasar, who are quite troubled by him, but on the whole they simply 
keep quiet and avoid him. They do not have, one could say, the means of a decisive critique 
easily to hand. There is a widely available shorthand for what people think is wrong with 
Rahner— he is too liberal, too Kantian, too captive to modern modes of thought—but none 
for what may in fact make many hesitate over Balthasar. If the accusation of a slide towards 
paganism came as readily to the lips of Christian theologians as the accusation of a slide 
towards liberalism, a much more articulate critique of Balthasar might by now have taken 
hold, and more generally Christian theology might proceed with a little more balance, 
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 For a helpful discussion of Balthasar on gender c.f. Corrine Crammer’s ‘One sex or two? Balthasar’s theology 
of the sexes’ in the Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
opposing to the fear of liberal accommodation to the times on the one side the fear of 
paganising subChristian backsliding on the other.  
What I have suggested so far is that if Christian theology could in some way take on 
board, even in part, the suggestion that paganism may be a danger, a temptation, constantly 
threatening it, this might introduce a useful means of self-critique, and might bring about a 
certain shift in the dominant contemporary theological mood. This would also, it is worth 
noting, represent a significant shift on another level, a shift in thinking about what it might 
mean for Christian theology to take Judaism seriously. While this has been a real concern for 
at least some Christian theologians, on the whole the presumption has been that it is precisely 
in rejecting liberalism and questioning many of the presuppositions of modernity that  
Christian theology will be in a position to be serious about its relationship with Judaism—for 
only then can Christianity take its roots, its particularity, its concreteness, to be central to its 
identity. Only if we free ourselves, the thinking usually goes, from an Enlightenment 
mentality with its premium on universality and a neutrally conceived rationality can we begin 
to rediscover that it is precisely the God of Israel that we worship, and can we begin to notice 
just how thoroughly and decisively Christianity is rooted in Judaism. But what I am 
suggesting is more or less the reverse of this: that if Christianity focuses too heavily on 
purging itself of liberal tendencies and on setting its face against modernity, then it may fail to 
take Judaism seriously, in the sense that it will miss a significant chance to learn something it 
really needs to know from modern Jewish thought.  
